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Abstract
Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005) have documented the failure of stan-
dard labor market search models to match business cycle ￿ uctuations
in employment and unemployment. They argue that it is likely that
wages are not adjusted as regularly as suggested by the model, which
would explain why employment is more volatile than the model pre-
dicts. We explore whether this explanation is consistent with the data.
The main insight is that the relevant wage data for the search model
are not aggregate wages, but wages of newly hired workers. Prelimi-
nary results show that wages for those workers are much more volatile
than aggregate wages, suggesting that other (real) frictions might be
more important than wage stickiness.
1 Summary
Rigid wages can help to improve the performance of labor market search
models in explaining business cycle ￿ uctuations. In this paper, we argue
however, that this modi￿cation of the standard models may not be justi￿-
able on empirical grounds. While we do not question the observation that
aggregate wages are not very volatile, we argue that the relevant wage series
for a theory of job creation should be the wages for newly hired workers
rather than aggregate wages.
There are many theoretical reasons why wages of ongoing work-relationships
are relatively insensitive to productivity ￿ uctuations at business cycle fre-
quencies. We can think of union agreements, wage indexation, e¢ ciency
wages (Yellen 1984), implicit contract agreements or motivational consider-
ations (Bewley 1989, 1999). In addition, there is ample empirical evidence
that aggregate productivity at the time of hiring has long-lasting e⁄ects on
the wage of a worker (Beaudry and Di Nardo 1991). However, none of these
1arguments play a role for new hires, at least not without further assump-
tions. Hall (2005), for example, resorts to a social norm in order to extend
wage stickiness to newly hired workers.
Beaudry and DiNardo￿ s model of implicit wage contracts is a good il-
lustration of the type of wage rigidity that we believe to be more plausi-
ble. Upon the start of a work-relationship the bargaining parties are rela-
tively free in their wage determination. However, once the contract has been
signed, wages can no longer be changed very much. This kind of rigidity
may be su¢ cient to make employment more volatile in a Real Business Cy-
cle model, where the representative agent chooses how many hours to work
based on the going wage rate. It is no use however, to amplify unemployment
￿ uctuations in a job matching model.
In Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2005), Nash bargaining is iden-
ti￿ed as the culprit why the standard Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) matching
model cannot generate observed unemployment ￿ uctuations. Shimer sug-
gests a procyclical bargaining power for the ￿rm as a shortcut to help ￿rms
reap more bene￿ts from technological upswings. Hall (2005) proposes to
model wage rigidity along the lines of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and
Malcomson (1999), in addition to a social norm that assures that new jobs
are paid the same wage as existing jobs. The bottom line of these and
other (e.g. Kennan 2005) proposed solutions is that, for some reason or
other, wages of newly hired workers are insensitive to ￿ uctuations in the
productivity of these workers. This gives ￿rms stronger incentives to post
many more vacancies in booms, which then creates the large unemployment
￿ uctuations that we observe in the data.
In this paper we argue that the observed wages of new hires are in fact
rather sensitive to cyclical changes in economic conditions. We construct
quarterly wage series using earnings data from the outgoing rotation groups
of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Since 1994, a separate question in
the CPS asks employed workers whether they are working in the same job as
last month. This question allows us to distinguish newly hired workers from
workers in an older match. To obtain a longer time series, we also use em-
ployment status, industry and occupation in the previous month to identify
new hires. We show that for the full sample of all workers in the CPS, our
wage series looks similar to, and is highly correlated with, aggregate wages.
The main exercise is to compare the volatility of average wages for newly
hired workers with the volatility of average wages of workers that have been
in the same job for at least one month (job stayers). This exercise is com-
plicated by the fact that the sample size for new hires is much smaller than
that for job stayers. Therefore, sampling error will make wages for new
hires look more volatile even if they are not. Clearly, a well-speci￿ed test
has to account for this problem. Simple box plots provide a ￿rst glimpse of
the result (see ￿gure). The two plots represent the variability in quarterly
2(HP ￿ltered) wages for new hires (job switchers plus previously unemployed
workers) and for a random subsample of job stayers, so that the sample sizes
are equal for the two groups of workers. Clearly, wages of new hires are more
volatile. An F-test overwhelmingly rejects the null that the two variances
are equal (p-value 1.3%).
In order to get better estimates, we consider the relevant component
of the volatility in both series, i.e. the part of the variance that re￿ ects
changes in economic conditions. Since the sampling error is uncorrelated
over time, the elasticity of wages with respect to productivity provides a
reliable measure of this component. Moreover, it is directly comparable
to the predictions of a search model with stochastic match productivity.
Preliminary estimates suggest that the elasticity of wages with respect to
productivity is much smaller for job stayers, but close to one for new hires,
as the standard search model would predict.
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